THE PLAIN VIEW

APRIL 1947

The Profit Motive: The Economists' View.
MAURICE DOBB

The Social Consequences of Large-Scale Scientific Development.
SYBIL MATHEWS

Symposium: The Religious Upbringing and Moral Training of Children Without Theology.
VIRGINIA FLEMMING H. J. BLACKHAM H. A. T. CHILD

Commentary and Book Reviews

QUARTERLY • ONE SHILLING

THE ETHICAL UNION
VoL 2
No 1

THE PLAIN VIEW

a humanist journal concerned with human relations and with the quality of living

---

Ουδεν ικανον ω ολιγον το ικανον

—EPICURUS

Nothing is sufficient for him to whom what is sufficient seems little.

ubertates et copiae virtutis

—CICERO

the productiveness and the resources of human quality

This is that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, if contemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly conjoined and united together than they have been; a conjunction like unto that of the two highest planets, Saturn the planet of rest and contemplation, and Jupiter, the planet of civil society and action.

—BACON

X 0
P733 v.II

What the plain view perceives is neither obvious nor obscure

26810

Vol. II. No. 1. APRIL, 1947

CONTENTS

	PAGE
COMMENTARY	3
THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE ECONOMISTS' VIEW MAURICE DOBB	9
THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LARGE-SCALE SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT SYBIL MATHEWS	15
THE RELIGIOUS UPBRINGING AND MORAL TRAINING OF CHILDREN WITHOUT THEOLOGY	22
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PARENTS FOR THE RELIGIOUS UPBRINGING OF THEIR CHILDREN VIRGINIA FLEMMING	26
THE AIMS AND CONTENTS OF RELIGIOUS TEACHING AND MORAL TRAINING ON HUMANIST ASSUMPTIONS H. J. BLACKHAM	29
THE PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT. APPROPRIATE METHODS AND MATERIALS H. A. T. CHILD	34
BOOK REVIEWS:—	
MYTH AND RITUAL IN DANCE, GAME AND RHYME By LEWIS SPENCE	40
POPULATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND PEACE By J. C. FLUGEL	41
THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANISM REPORT OF A CONFERENCE	43
YUGOSLAVIA FACES THE FUTURE By J. KLUGMAN and OTHERS	43
THE TRIAL OF DR. STEPINAC By BETTY WALLACE	43
CORRESPONDENCE	45
NOTICES	47

Edited by H. J. Blackham for The Ethical Union,
4a, Inverness Place, Queensway, London, W.2.

Subscription for one year 4/6 post free.

COMMENTARY

BRITAIN'S FATE. The London correspondent of the *New York Times* in a despatch to his paper on the fuel crisis described Britain as "an old, run-down country". A run-down farm may be no bad investment for a man of energy and ideas with capital to spare. But Britain has not changed hands and the sting of Mr. Hoffman's appraisal is in his doubt whether the British people have it in them to save themselves. Do they understand what a dire fate threatens them? The question at issue is whether forty million people can continue to live on this island. If not, the necessary adjustment will be long and cruel.

The situation may stimulate us to invention and research, wise planning, good management, and united effort; it may throw us into a panic; its meaning may be neglected as long as possible. All three reactions are evident in opinions and policies canvassed in the press. Translation of the code language of statistics into the graphic signs of hold-up and breakdown of fuel supplies has not brought home to everybody what the real nature of the situation is. The loud imperative of immediate needs makes it advisable, since it is possible, to bring in foreign labour to help fill the gaps. The probability that this remedy will itself create serious problems, immediately and later on, and aggravate the main problem, shows how really urgent the crisis is and how likely we are to run to panic measures. Apart from the need to double and treble the efficiency of men, management, and machines, a sufficient problem in itself, the core of the difficulty is in the need for a rational reallocation of productive resources, and the need to find adequate incentives and tolerable methods to effect this readjustment. We must produce first things first. What are first things? The labour shortages give only the beginning of the answer, for the question involves us in consideration of what in the long run is to be the stable balance of our economy in the circumstances of the post-war world. If a managed economy is to deliver us from the cruel adjustments of the crude old method of trial and error, we need to get early sight of the probabilities upon which we can build a permanent national life. On this point the White Paper insists that international uncertainties make it impossible at this stage to formulate reliable plans. Whatever the uncertainties it is clearly certain that economic processes will go on and will give a shape to the national economy which is likely to aggravate the difficulty of planning national recovery later on when the government feels sufficiently informed. It is better to proceed boldly now with a programme of development based upon reasonable assumptions.

The question whether forty million people can continue to live on this island is the question whether we can continue after the

loss of so many of our former advantages, and in the changed circumstances of world economy, to compete in world markets, and buy and sell on an ever greater scale. The economic advantages which remain to us are dramatically concentrated in ourselves: this same population whose fortunes are at stake and which depends now for its future no longer upon the safe possession of solid natural assets and habitual markets but precariously upon its skills, its science, its experience, its methods, its character. Such assets are not less real and enriching than abundant natural resources or a dominant trading position, but they are more liable to vanish overnight and leave their possessors without either visible or invisible means of support. That is the danger of our situation. It imposes the need for the closest social partnership in production. Such a partnership cannot be achieved if it is "considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee . . . It is to be looked on with other reverence", for it is a partnership in a complete life and a common interest, since the social programme of our time depends upon it. Recovery is impossible, but there is a great democratic future in this country if our predicament can get us into new ways of co-operation which will engender more enthusiasm for the possibilities of social life in Britain than has yet appeared. Otherwise, let our island sink back into the brumous obscurity from which it emerged.

RURAL REVOLUTION. Whatever may be the future market for our exported manufactures we most certainly ought to safeguard our position by expanding our agriculture in order to close as nearly as possible the gap which has to be filled by importing food supplies. This is what many people say or think. So long of course as we can continue to buy staple foodstuffs from abroad at prices well below the cost of home production, the labour force per man hour in the factories is likely to be providing the British market with more food than the labour force in the fields. This has been a main condition of past prosperity, and to divert men from industry to the land so long as this condition holds is uneconomic. For this reason it has long been difficult to measure the efficiency or relative value of our agriculture in the national economy, and our agricultural policy has therefore been arbitrary and capricious. Now, with the exhaustion of world food stocks, the uncertainty of world markets, and the limits put upon our export capacity by shortages of power and of raw materials, perhaps also of men, we certainly cannot afford to leave British agriculture to take its luck. The Agriculture Bill makes it clear that the Government has no intention of doing so, for it guarantees prices and assures markets to home production.

We need policies that will raise output per man hour both in factories and on farms. Our farms are excessively wasteful of man power. Our agriculture fully as much as our coal mining needs to be rationalized. To attract workers into agriculture by bringing wages and rural conditions and amenities up to urban standards (ultimately at the expense of the industrial workers) is wasteful unless farming practice is also brought up to the best technical standards. The Bill tries to provide for this; but quite inadequately. Men, management, and machines may do their best and the county agricultural executive committees may be vigilant and zealous, but it is impossible for land to be efficiently cultivated so long as farms continue to be inefficient units in point of size, layout, and equipment. A revision of farm boundaries and the equipment and servicing of farms for the purposes of modern businesslike farming are as necessary for progress to-day as was land enclosure at an earlier time. The policy now as then is revolutionary and bears harshly on many interests. But society to-day is better prepared and equipped to minimize and mitigate the harsh effects; and in any case those are doomed already who cannot reach the threshold of efficiency established by the new Bill. The times are serious, and half-measures will not help. By guaranteeing the home market to farmers we are throwing away some of our chances of regaining former prosperity. If we want to make the most of our agricultural resources, we should at least ensure that we are enabled to do so with the minimum labour. The drastic remodelling and adequate equipment of farm units is the only way of doing this, and of establishing the place of farming in our national economy.

Peasant farming and "rural idiocy" belong to the past. The land farmed on modern lines offers interesting and responsible work attractive to high grade workers. Such workers, enjoying good wages and good conditions and the amenities of an organized rural community, would help to solve more than one of our problems.

A HUMAN ORDER. The impulse to form a Virgil Society here during the protracted struggle of the war owed as much to the natural piety of the Roman cultivator as to the fascination of the great poet, the *only* classic in the reasoned judgment of T. S. Eliot, the Society's first president. It was not to the Augustan age that the ironies, distempers, and perils of our own prompted some contemporaries to turn, but to the immemorial culture supported by the countryside, which in that age produced a Virgil to give it tender memorial.

Compared with the Greeks at their best, eagerly pursuing the reasoned (the examined) life, managing their many interests with masterly moderation, taking the way of things with a realism

brilliantly spirited: compared with this, the piety of the Roman cultivator was altogether commonplace. Even cultured Roman writers had nothing to add to Greek subtlety or to Greek range. Yet when you come across in Cicero the phrase *"ubertates et copiae virtutis"*, you see something the Romans had of their own which the Greeks did not have a word for. The phrase is a metaphorical marriage of natural abundance with human genius, the fertility of the earth with man's economy, producing the plenitude which supplies the good life. This sense of the earth, deeply founded in sensation, rising into love and duty, the husbandman as father of his patrimony: this creative union, consummate in Virgil, is hardly found in the maturity of the Greeks.

A good custom, a useful skill, a perceptive saying, a tried virtue: these and their like, empirical findings, husbanded and piously used and passed on, are the rudiments of culture, traditional ways and means of good living. They are seen, valued, and used with simple directness, until, like the grain of mustard seed, they reach up and fill the sky with science and philosophy, art and industry, law and politics.

One thing leads to another, men pursue possibilities, ramifications, divisions and sub-divisions; the means of life are multiplied and scattered abroad; adventure and pursuit are the ruling ideals; the lure lies in the unknown, the untried, the unachieved. There is cultural poverty in plenty. Life takes charge of the living, as property of the owner. Few in such times enjoy any spiritual possessions, but there is glory in the excitements and austerities of expansion. The glory is dimmed by the vulgarities when expansion passes into its commercial phase: the multiplication of trivial wants, the gross stimulation of acquisitiveness, the substitution of exploitation for husbandry, and the transvaluation of all values under the sovereignty of money. These ironies and futilities of industrial civilization had been recognized long before the dark hours of uncertainty during the war which caused a few literary-minded persons to fear that the resources of our great inheritance had fallen irrecoverably into the hands of prodigal heirs, and moved them to turn to Virgil with the common recognition that he expressed the inwardness of a natural order, mature model of one of the great patterns of final living.

The best known of these persons were believers in the super-natural order of Dante, yet it was not to this order that they turned (nor to the rational order of Plato), but to the natural order of Virgil; for here under the sacred obligations of the husbandman was the immediacy of culture, blessing the pious cultivator with fruits and finalities. There is healing in Virgil, truly, but we must not be misled: his natural order is not a model for our human

order, save in its moralities. In this he is immensely relevant, for this is the soul of the achievement which lies before this age, an age of conservation and definition, whose task it is to apply the resources of industry and of culture to the daily needs and uses of all, in a way satisfying to the spirit. The pattern of established relations within which this is to be done has already been sufficiently indicated in contemporary trends. The moralities which would make of it a sacred *unitas* receive from Virgil supreme encouragement, for it is he who communicates supremely the blessing of that spiritual achievement.

THE GREAT AGES. We stand on the threshold of a great age. And we live in the course of one. Not only because the questions at issue in our time are very likely to influence decisively the destiny of mankind, but also because the present manifestations of the human spirit in every kind of activity abundantly challenge the achievements of the past. Human energy, audacity, fertility, brilliance, intelligence, sensibility, generosity were never more copiously displayed and more prodigally scattered. In our time the gifts of men are not developed upon a common material in a common training and consummated in performances and achievements which appeal to the enjoyment of a common taste. That type of culture has been lost, and the loss is real, as real as the gain, which is immense. The diversification of talents in specialized pursuits has been the mainspring of our expansion; and the material achievements it has produced have no precedents for comparison. But also in the traditional fields cultivated by the stable culture which has gone, contemporary performance shows no decadence. In philosophy, pre-eminently, the present age is conspicuously rich in examples of close analysis, of monumental speculative construction, and of brilliant literary exposition. In scholarship there is no lack of definitive work exhibiting the highest standards of learning, discrimination, and detachment. In the arts, even if there are few stable styles and sustained, publicized movements to impress the public, there is undoubted talent and originality expressed in a range of experimental work; and there is a background of intelligence, sensibility, and taste at a high level of genuine aesthetic sophistication remarkably free from the precious and the snobbish. Indeed, it is not reckless to suggest that for intelligent and sensitive appreciation and subtle interpretation over the whole range of human endeavour past and present, the cultivated minds of our time have never been surpassed. One is tempted to say that our distinctive strength is in this sympathetic intelligence. But that would be to underestimate the powerful team work in science, in building and engineering, and in large-scale organization.

Professor Whitehead remarks that, "on the whole, the great ages have been unstable ages." Perhaps that is no more than to express a romantic preference, a temperamental choice. Certainly the ages of consolidation, concentration, and inwardness have been great ages, and have exercised an enchantment when their secret has been lost. One must concede that all the crowded ages of modern times are great ages; and inexhaustible. The man who is tired of history is tired of life, is not perhaps equal to its (admittedly exhausting) stimulus. "Neither paganism nor Christianity ever produced a profound political historian whose mind was not turned to gloom by the contemplation of the affairs of men." This sombre saying of Acton's may be demonstrably true. But what it implies is another question. The philosophizing historian contemplating the affairs of men composes a tragedy which encompasses mankind. The affairs of men may be saturated with tragedy; but history is not a tragedy. The moral value of tragic drama is that it rouses the mind to aching recognition of the untragic possibilities of human life—opened to the spectator because closed to the *dramatis personae*. We who are living are fools if in our minds we allow ourselves to be put upon the stage when our place is in the audience and our part is in the world. Let the dramatist make his tragedies of history. But when the philosophic historian does it he is doing something quite different, and he makes a fool of himself. Once we see the difference, we shall not let him make fools of us.

THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE ECONOMISTS' VIEW

[The following article is contributed to a series on the profit motive in trade and industry. Four other essays in this series were printed in the issues of July, 1946 and January, 1947.]

DISCUSSIONS on the subject of the profit motive are sometimes conducted as though the profit motive and monetary incentive were identical. But when one is considering the economic significance of individual profit-making, it is essential that one should draw a clear distinction between the two. Monetary incentive may take a variety of forms and may relate to a number of different types of decision or of activity: for example, a system of payment by results acts as an incentive to the expenditure of effort by the wage-earner, and may exist both in a capitalist and a socialist economy. Profit, however, represents a payment to a particular class of persons and as an incentive is linked with a particular set of decisions: it is the income of the capitalist *entrepreneur* who owns and controls an economic enterprise and holds in his hands certain crucial decisions concerning investment and output. As a motive-force and an economic regulator it can only have any significance in a capitalist economy: in an economy where capital is owned and industry is directed by individuals (either singly or in groups) with the intention of commercial gain. A State concern may operate at a profit, in the sense of showing a surplus of receipts over outgoings. But this profit is evidently not the motive of its economic activity; and it may not even be regarded as being a *criterion* by which efficiency is judged and the expansion or contraction of the concern is regulated. At any rate, the *maximisation* of profit will no longer be an end of economic activity.

In the 19th century the traditional emphasis of political economy lay upon the beneficence of the profit motive: upon a demonstration that, when economic decisions were taken by individual *entrepreneurs*, each anxious to promote his own self-interest, the best interests of the community as a whole were thereby served. This came about because the pressure of competition curbed the actions of each and all ("as if by an unseen hand," according to Adam Smith's expressive simile) in such a way as to keep prices down to costs, so that the consumer benefited from every advance in productivity, and to distribute productive resources between various uses in such a way that the satisfaction of consumers' demand was achieved to a maximum extent. Actually a proof of this latter proposition was not afforded, in any rigorous form at least, until the Subjective (Utility) Theory of Value came into its own towards the end of the 19th century. The proof, when it came, contained a crucial flaw insofar as it was applied to any situation except one of equal incomes for all citizens: a fact which some, though by no means all, economists hastened to point out. Never-

theless, it was held to indicate that, in face of any given pattern of income-distribution, a condition of unfettered individual enterprise tended to achieve an *optimum* satisfaction of consumers' demand—to satisfy this demand to the fullest extent, and in the most balanced way that was possible with existing resources, and to do so at the least cost. It was admitted that large economic inequalities lessened the economic welfare which a given total of wealth could yield, and that some reduction of inequality was desirable. But since a considerable degree of inequality was held to be necessary for the efficient working of a capitalist system—to provide adequate profit-incentives and to provide a source of capital accumulation—this inequality was generally regarded as a necessary price that had to be paid for economic progress. To make any large inroads on that inequality would sacrifice more in wealth than was gained in welfare.

Within the last half-century this traditional doctrine began to be seriously weakened by the admission of a number of cases where the incentive of individual profit failed to yield the best result, judged by economic criteria defining the *optimum* distribution of productive resources. This failure was independent of the distorting effect of unequal incomes upon demand, causing high social priorities such as rehousing the overcrowded to be neglected in favour of the trivial but high-powered demands of the rich. The failure was due to the fact that certain kinds of cost and certain kinds of benefit did not enter into business accounting at all—did not affect any of the items in a firm's balance sheet—and were accordingly neglected by the private *entrepreneur* in arriving at his economic decisions. The examples of this are fairly familiar. It may "pay" an individual capitalist to locate his factory where its smoke-fumes will ruin the health of a town and blacken its buildings or where its refuse will pollute the water of its rivers. From the community's point of view, when such damage is calculated as part of the cost, some other location is preferable. Again, it may profit an individual employer to sweat and physically exhaust the human beings in his employ, if labour is sufficiently plentiful for him to re-staff his factories every few years. On the other hand the development of a plant or a process which will result in extensive economies to other plants or other industries may not profit an individual *entrepreneur* even though from a general point of view it would be abundantly worth while.

Such cases, however, continued to be treated (at least, by academic economists) as exceptions: as special cases which could be dealt with by a system of occasional taxes or prohibitions and subsidies, and which did not impugn the general argument in favour of individual profit as the criterion of economic efficiency and the spur to progress. What in recent years has shifted the

focus of discussion much more radically, so far as professional economists are concerned, is a new attention to the theory of monopoly combined with the new theory of employment associated with the name of the late Lord Keynes.

With regard to monopoly the apologists of capitalism had, again, adopted the standpoint that this was a special case, which did not impugn the general beneficence of competitive individualism. The reason was that monopoly was regarded as only existing where one producer or seller controlled so overwhelming a majority of the supply as to be in a position to dictate the price, or where all sellers acted in close collusion in their sales policy. Monopoly was accordingly viewed as consisting of comparatively small islands in a sea of competition, which lapped the shores of these islands and even eroded their boundaries. Monopoly appeared as blemishes upon the economic system which called for some departure to be made from the rigorous doctrine of *laissez-faire;* whether this departure took the form of price-fixing by State organs, disallowance by some public body of price- and output-agreements or the trust-busting that was practised in U.S.A. Between the wars facts were beginning to make the pretence that monopoly could be treated as an exceptional case rather thin. But so far as economic doctrine was concerned, what shifted the whole balance of the argument was the new setting in which the question was placed by the new theory of "imperfect competition" or "monopolistic competition," associated with the names of Mrs. Joan Robinson in this country and of Professor Chamberlin in America. This theory applied to that large intermediate tract of country which fell short of monopoly in its traditional interpretation: to all those cases where the working of competition was obstructed by the operation of various types of friction but where no one seller concentrated in his hands so large a proportion of the output as to give him monopoly-power over price and output in the traditional sense. What was of crucial significance in this new brand of theory was that this intermediate tract (comprising, indeed, the majority of actual cases and hence constituting "the general case") was treated in terms of the theory of monopoly, differing from the latter only in the degree to which the producers and sellers had it in their power to enhance their profits by restricting output and raising the price. Previously frictional elements had been treated merely as *retarding* the operation of the beneficent forces of competition; delaying the speed with which adjustments operated, but leaving unchanged the final equilibrium position to which competitive forces were always tending. Now these frictional elements were regarded as shifting the final equilibrium position itself; and "pure competition" itself became a special case. Advertisement and devices of salesmanship might attract a *clientèle* of customers for a special seller or a brand

or type of product; thereby creating a privileged market in which the producer or seller in question could exercise a degree of monopoly power. The same situation might result from any of a number of other factors which tended to create special attachments (or "preferences") of buyers to particular sellers; this despite the fact that sellers were numerous and were in apparent competition with one another. Moreover, fewness of sellers, even when they were still sufficiently numerous for no one of them alone to dominate the market, might mean that each reckoned the effect of his own output-policy upon the market-price and hence upon his own receipts and accordingly had a bias towards restriction of output.

According to the emphasis of this newer approach to the problem of competition and monopoly, it is only in the comparatively rare case where competition operates perfectly and without friction that the *optimum* position, as this has been defined by economics text-books, is reached. In all other cases profit operates as a motive-force towards *restriction*: within the limits imposed by the market situation the capitalist *entrepreneur* will be able to maximise his profits by action which is to the positive *dis*advantage of consumers (and/or of the workers employed by him). Looked at from this angle, much, if not most, business "goodwill," arising from an intangible complex of business connections, patent rights and business reputation, represents earning-power rooted in the ability to buy or sell in conditions of market-privilege, where the pressure of competition is in some degree restricted. Even where economic rivalry is keen, this rivalry to-day more often seems to take the form of piling up selling-costs to entice the consumer—in some cases to bludgeon him into belief in the superiority of some particular product—than of the price-competition of the economic text-books. We find ourselves in a world—to the old-fashioned economist an Alice-through-the-Looking-Glass world—such as the American writer Thorstein Veblen depicted in rotund but iconoclastic phrases, where the major part of capital values represent, not the capitalized value of productive services to the community, but "capitalized withdrawal of efficiency," and where profit represents, not a badge of service, but a toll such as highwaymen or racketeers levy—a reward exacted by the "legal right of sabotage which inheres as a natural right in the ownership of industrially useful things" and which enables the owners "to dictate satisfactory terms": a title to ownership "traceable to an act of seizure, legalised by statute or confirmed by long undisturbed possession."†

A second shift of emphasis, no less devastating in its effect on traditional notions, has resulted from the recognition that unemployment is a chronic, and not merely an occasional and

†T. Veblen, *Absentee Ownership*, 51, 67; also his *Vested Interests, passim.*

intermittent, feature of the capitalist world with its profit-motivation. Traditional economic notions had no room for unemployment unless it was due to temporary causes or else the result either of shortage of capital or of wages being in some sense too high. But the feature of the modern unemployment problem—of what Sir William Beveridge calls "mass unemployment"—is precisely its coexistence with unutilised capital equipment and its persistence even in years of relative prosperity. The much-quoted estimate of the Brookings Institute in U.S.A. indicated that excess capacity of industrial plant in American industry may have amounted to as much as 20 per cent. in the "boom" year of 1928-9 and to 50 per cent. or more at the depth of the ensuing slump. Previously the idea that unemployment and economic crises were rooted in the very structure of the economic system was confined to economic heretics like Marx or J. A. Hobson. The orthodox regarded unemployment and slumps as ephemeral growing-pains of an expanding system: unavoidable accompaniments of any system which gave freedom of choice to consumers or freedom of choice of occupation to its workers. The automatic adjustments of an individualist system were always tending to restore a condition of full employment whenever this was departed from.

The theory of unemployment associated with the name of Lord Keynes, which attributes unemployment to deficiency of effective demand, and in particular to deficiency of investment, might seem at first sight to have little to do with the goodness or badness of the profit motive. True, a principal reason why investment (and hence demand) is chronically deficient, according to this theory, is that investment undertaken by individual *entrepreneurs* is actuated by the profit-motive, and there are reasons why the profit to be expected from new assets tends to be insufficient to maintain investment at a level consistent with full employment. But the main emphasis of the theory would seem to lie upon the defects of planlessness: on the absence in a capitalist system of any mechanism whereby the supply of productive resources and the demand for their products can be co-ordinated at the most efficient level. Chronic waste of productive resources is the result of this planlessness. The system is always operating at a sub-normal level.

To make such a distinction, however, between the effects of profit-making and of planlessness would be artificial. One cannot analyse the profit-motive in a vacuum: it is, in fact, the motivation of a whole system of economic relationships, which has to be regarded and assessed as a whole. It is an integral part of the mechanism of a capitalist economy that economic decisions are taken in response to price-movements on a market; the regulator of these responses being the desire of the capitalist *entrepreneur* to maximise his profit. If this motive did not actuate the response,

then a capitalist system would behave quite differently from the way in which economists (whether apologists for the system or critics of it) have always described it as working. Looked at in this way, global economic planning and a system of individual profit-making represent antitheses; since the former represents the essential alternative to the regulation of economic activity by individual responses to the price-situation on a market. True, one can to a certain extent put the profit-motive in harness to a plan: by hedging the former with sufficient limits and controls one may force it to operate in a particular direction and divert it from operating in other directions. To this extent the opposites may interpenetrate. Nevertheless they remain antithetical modes of driving and steering economic activities, since planning presupposes, not merely a co-ordination of numerous atomistic decisions, but the introduction of a new social motivation, which is guided by new purposes and which, because it is joined to a larger unit of decision (a unit coterminous with the whole of society), has regard to factors which do not figure at all in the reckoning of individual profit-making. These factors comprise those relationships of interdependence between different economic activities which together give to a system of production and exchange an organic character.

Few in this country to-day, except the fanatics of 19th century individualism and *laissez-faire*, would defend the unfettered operation of the individual profit-motive. Even the defenders of capitalism and free enterprise (although this is scarcely true of America) advocate some form of controlled capitalism, even if the controls they favour are usually weak and half-hearted. But over the major part of Europe to-day the tide is set in the direction of a progressive supersession of profit-maximisation as a motive of economic decision by forms of economic planning, inspired by a social motivation. It is a contest between two systems. What gives this contest its particular sharpness is that profit does not exist just as an abstract principle, but is a form of income: moreover, a form of income that is responsible in main part for the economic and social inequalities of our capitalist world. As a form of income it is sharply contrasted with the form of income upon which the overwhelming majority of the population of industrial countries have to rely: income for work, or wages for the hire of a worker's working time. It is contrasted with the latter because profit as an income is associated, not with work and activity, but essentially with rights of ownership: moreover, in our modern world, as we have seen, with various species of monopoly-rights. Hence the contest of two principles and of two systems assumes the historical form of a contest between two kinds of income and between the two broad classes that are dependent for their economic existence upon these kinds of income. MAURICE DOBB

THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LARGE-SCALE SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT

"There is now, as always, freedom of choice between good and evil fruits of knowledge; and the ways in which these are cultivated or controlled will be the reply to the menace now facing civilized peoples. All who have goodness in their hearts and goodwill towards their fellows should unite in meeting this challenge to movement onwards and upward."

Sir Richard Gregory, F.R.S., Presidential Address, British Association, 1946.

THE menace now facing civilized peoples is twofold. There is, on the one hand, the possibility that they will destroy themselves, and on the other that man will become degenerate.

Science has made possible the integration of humanity into much larger groups than ever before, so that random development has been replaced by human guidance. Hitherto human management has generally been short-sightedly egoistical, each person, tribe or nation arranging its affairs to suit its own convenience irrespective of the harm it might do to its neighbours or to posterity. Natural selection played its part in the survival of tribes and nations, and none of these was so large and powerful that it could catastrophically affect the rest of humanity. But recently science has provided not only the means of destroying civilization, but also the means of organising it for better or for worse; and there are many who, panic stricken, say that the burden of responsibility is too much and who wish we were back in the nursery.

Although moral geniuses throughout the ages predicted disaster for nations who sell their souls to material luxury or lust for power, it is doubtful whether their adherents foresaw that science would make humanity more vulnerable to the consequences of these sins when they persecuted those who became its devotees. During the Middle Ages science was suppressed as dangerous heresy because scientists must necessarily have an irreverent curiosity, and any questioning of the priestly hierarchy tended to upset the established social order. The Christian priests did not follow the Babylonian and Egyptian customs of being official scientists themselves, and any individual who pursued his own researches risked the displeasure of his superiors.

It was when science was found to be useful in warfare that the military rulers began to patronise its exponents, though even such powerful patronage did not protect Galileo from the Church. Later, the growth of overseas empires encouraged scientific aids to navigation, and industrialists found scientists indispensable in exploiting mineral wealth.

By the beginning of the twentieth century priests no longer wielded power in industrialized countries, and the rulers of these countries, having set science on its feet and made it respectable, proceeded to use it for building up terrifying armaments to guard their wealth and intimidate their rivals. The pursuit of industrial efficiency became paramount in a highly competitive world, and it culminated in two devastating wars which left the majority of the hitherto civilized nations chaotic and impoverished, whether they were victors or vanquished.

The Effect of Science on Warfare

The Atomic Bomb emphasizes the destructive powers of modern weapons. These produce such devastation when used against civilized communities that they cancel the chief purpose of aggressive warfare, namely, material gain. Though indiscriminate slaughter and destruction might be discounted by an attacker assaulting a strategic position, successful capture of it would not exempt the newcomers from the same sort of attack which they themselves had practised. While the issue of the conflict still hung in the balance they would find it incredibly difficult to consolidate their gains. Offensive weapons have at last outstripped defensive weapons, and the predominant prospect offered by modern war is destruction.

Atom bombs, carried by rockets or jet planes, and bacteriological warfare make all forms of passive defence uneconomic, to say the least of it. Target-seeking missiles might be a means of interception, but the more deadly the form of attack, the more necessary it is to approach one hundred per cent. interception if the latter is to be worth while. The only effective defence is counter-attack and to destroy the offensive at its source. This implies that future antagonists would inflict unrestrained and horrible damage on one another, their allies would join in the holocaust, and civilization would be blotted out. Attack might be insidious instead of sudden, as in the case of bacteriological warfare, and an indolent, divided, or Maginot-minded community might become a temptation to a more energetic neighbour. Alternatively, fanaticism might lead a nation to risk destruction for the sake of imposing its ideology on other peoples.

The social implication of this danger is that nations must unite in supporting international law and in having an effective force for inspecting and restraining potential aggressors. (Scientists throughout the world are already united in condemning the use of atomic bombs.) The secret preparation of attacks involving highly scientific weapons would thus be rendered extremely difficult, and should such attacks erupt they could be dealt with as out-

breaks of crime. There would at first be unfortunate victims, but the murderers should not be able to dominate humanity so long as threatened communities refused to be intimidated into becoming accomplices.

Science has unwittingly provided the stimulus for removing warfare from the category of legitimate human activity. Whether nations persist in retaining their individual rights of exclusive control over their weapons of destruction will depend on the sanity and goodwill of all concerned.

Science in Industry

Science has bestowed on us material blessings and has endowed us with new faculties that would be quite incredible if they were not matters of fact. The abstruseness and complications of modern scientific problems leave each one of us in the role of uninitiated partaker of benefits understod only by the specialists who produced them.

We have electrical substitutes for human labour—from electric motors to the "electronic brain" (which is, however, merely an elaborate calculating machine and has no power of initiative). We have electron microscopes with magnetic lenses which produce images of viruses and other objects too small to illuminate, thus providing us with the equivalent of a new visual sense. Discoveries and inventions such as X-rays, aeroplanes and radio have become commonplace. We can synthesize, from coal and air, substitutes for vegetable materials such as resins, rubber and fibres used in textile manufacture. And we can produce goods in enough abundance to supply the whole population instead of only the privileged few, with progressively decreasing hours of labour.

Yet all this is being done at a sacrifice.

The harnessing of science to the pursuit of industrial efficiency has resulted in closing the outlets for the average man's creative ability and exercise of initiative, and has transformed him during his working hours into an automaton. Scientific instruments and processes made possible the advent of mass production, which has been welcomed so ardently by profiteers and many consumers.

Mass production is a far more significant development from a social point of view than is the control of atomic fission, even though the latter is scientifically the most important achievement since man first made fire. Although atomic piles will furnish easily transportable fuel for power stations and replenish our rapidly wasting natural resources, they will not revolutionise society. From the social point of view they are just another substitute for muscle-power and their utilization involves merely

the familiar industrial organisation of administrators, technicians and operatives.

It is the division of mental activity between these three groups that signifies the vast difference between individual and communal enterprise, and this division is inherent in mass production. It represents the second industrial revolution, and although it was started by an individualist, Henry Ford, it is the most practical contribution to industrial communism that the world has ever known.

When scientific industrial development was in its infancy, the inventor was frequently the factory owner, and his workmen included craftsmen who exercised individual skill and initiative. Now financiers or politicians control the administration of factories, and tell the technicians and scientists what objects they must pursue. Here we have the divorce of creative imagination from the exercise of initiative. The scientists and technicians in their turn have to devise cut-and-dried processes that will produce the greatest volume of goods in the least possible time; and this involves standardizing the very movements of the operatives, for the technicians are now assisted by production engineers, who study "time-and-motion" in the human automatons.

The men who serve the machines can exercise neither initiative nor imagination, but nevertheless must keep alert and must not be without intelligence. While initiative is for the administrators, and creation (but strictly answerable to higher authority) is for the technicians, the operatives must develop automatic brains which, so far as their work is concerned, are sterile. And they themselves have carried the submergence of individuality almost to extinction in obedience to the excessively rigid rules of their mammoth trade unions.

The material, as opposed to the spiritual, disadvantages of mass production, in its present state of development, is the waste it involves. There is a huge turnover of inferior goods which do not last nearly so long as those produced by individual craftsmen, and when these are damaged they are not considered worth repairing or collecting as salvage. Improved methods and greater attention to detail, also education of the public in the care and maintenance of goods and machinery, may eventually eliminate this waste, but at present it is added to the waste by war and waste by dissipation. There never before has been such wanton extravagance with natural resources. Even our amenities are wasted by our not disposing of industrial waste like slag heaps and smoke; while the waste of sewage, through pumping it into the sea, is viewed with alarm by responsible agriculturists.

Science in Agriculture

Science, when properly applied to agriculture, can banish famine and perennial undernourishment. If, on the other hand, it is allowed to be irresponsibly exploited by people interested only in immediate profits, it can undermine the health of the people and make deserts.

Agricultural science may be divided into three main sections, namely, breeding (whether of plants or animals), the supply of nourishment, and pest control. Any one of these, ignorantly applied, can cause disaster. An animal or plant breeder has to curb his enthusiasm for high yield by attention to its possible effect on the health of the subject, but this work is generally too exacting to appeal to the "get-rich-quick" type of mentality. Where the damage is being done nowadays is with the large-scale use of chemical fertilisers and insecticides.

The educated agriculturist knows that the soil is a living organism, and that, not only do the chemicals in the soil promote plant growth, but the presence of beneficial bacteria and minute fungi is essential for the production of healthy plants with a complete nutritional capacity. It is criminal to follow the irresponsible American method of ignorantly broadcasting chemicals wholesale without advice from competent soil biologists. Likewise, it is known that many insects are beneficial to plants, yet indiscriminate spraying with new insecticides is on the increase, and one has only to consider the lethal effect of D.D.T. on bees to realise how extremely dangerous to agriculture this practice can be.

There is room both for large-scale agriculture organised for the benefit of the community, and for the small individual farm which offers scope for experiment and for rugged individuality. As a way of life, small-scale agriculture can replenish, spiritually as well as materially, the health of a population jaded by urbanisation. Agricultural communities are more wholesome for child-rearing than are cities, and the simplest person can feel truly part of the universe when working in the open. The social groups are smaller and afford an escape from large-scale collectivism.

Entertainment, Education and Government

While mass production has gone far in stifling initiative among operatives, mass entertainment has carried the process still further. In a totalitarian state it can be combined with propaganda to consummate the surrender of individuality, but in a democracy its effect varies. In England the two forms of mass entertainment created by applied science, the cinema and the radio, demonstrate forcibly the influence of the profit motive. In our state-sponsored radio this is absent; in the cinema it is paramount. Our radio

tempers education and propaganda with a judicious pandering to the popular taste. But in the cinema the popular taste is the only consideration, and since this is not uniform, and as costly entertainment produced in bulk can not be accommodated to gradations, the material offered by the cinema is generally designed to suit the lowest common denominator of public taste. If only films could be shown by companies of artists unshackled by ulterior motives, they could be a wonderful vehicle for art and education.

Radio, as a means of communication with nation-wide audiences, has made an outstanding contribution to the betterment of government. It has vastly improved the approach of the politician to the people he hopes to represent and to govern, for though he addresses millions simultaneously these millions listen in small family groups and not in mobs. The voice of reason is therefore more powerful than that of emotion; and, unless there already exists sympathetic feeling for the orator's ideas, a demagogue finds no response in the listening circle. In any case he cannot sway his audience by rhetoric alone, but most produce arguments that will bear critical examination.

Remedies for Evil Consequences

The large-scale application of science calls for unprecedented exercise of wisdom, even in peace-time, if it is to be a blessing instead of a curse. We see that it tends to depress originally mediocre intelligence while it offers greater scope for a few outstanding minds. In a democracy, where the majority is supposed to determine the policies of the state, this can be devastating. We are faced with reconciling the position of the average worker as an automaton, producing material abundance for himself, with his position as a voter with his country's destiny in his hands.

If we take heed in time we might solve this problem and at the same time save the souls of our operatives. Cheap (but efficient) production of necessities for the whole population could be looked on as a chore which should occupy as little time as possible, and *additional work* of a different nature should be conveniently available to each person. Emotionally satisfying part-time work could be provided in the manufacture of luxury goods requiring individual craftsmanship or artistic ability, or in social service with hospitals, fire brigades and police, schools and homes. And people will need to look on this as part of their work, and not as part of the leisure occupation of a few worthy individuals, for the people who need this type of activity to enrich their characters are the very ones who might be too lazy to engage in it voluntarily. Those unsuited to social work and lacking dexterity could find healthy physical labour in maintaining social amenities such as parks, riding stables, flower gardens and sports grounds,

while those with access to the country might combine market gardening, fruit growing, or even part-time agriculture, with their factory routine.

By fostering activities that were necessary to man's development we preserve his emotional well-being. Wrestling, throwing, climbing, swimming, sailing, riding and other necessities of yesterday become the sports of to-day. So it should be with technical development. We must preserve craftsmanship and the arts, and also facilities for individual achievement, so that they are available to any person who has also to work at being a small unit in a large undertaking.

The administrators of the large industrial concerns should be people of the highest integrity, with deep human sympathy. The questionable company promoter and the ruthless thruster may have had their place in the commercial jungle, where energy was the chief asset and many tigers struggled for supremacy; but now, in the Eastern Hemisphere at any rate, we need captains of industry who will be wise generals and not freebooters, and we must not tolerate sneers at the ideal administrator that has long been presented to young citizens in training for positions of responsibility.

Science in the service of humanity needs the support of all men of goodwill, whatever differences may exist between their philosophies. From theistic Christians and Hindoos to atheist Marxists and Buddhists, as well as scientists and other philosophers who do not depend on speculation, they all have many ethical ideals in common which spring from their common humanity. In uniting against a short-sighted and egoistical materialism which exalts the competitive scramble for goods, and which depresses man spiritually below the level of animals who have not had his opportunities for development, they could encourage the wisest use of natural resources enabling humanity to develop fully and harmoniously.

SYBIL MATHEWS

THE RELIGIOUS UPBRINGING AND MORAL TRAINING OF CHILDREN WITHOUT THEOLOGY

[*We print below a survey of the Conference for Parents on the Religious Upbringing and Moral Training of Children which was held by the Ethical Union in London during the week-end January 25/26. The survey is followed by three papers, being, in each case, one of two on the topic of the session. Each has been cut to meet space requirements. The other contributors to these sessions were Mrs. Eva Hubback, Dr. Olaf Stapledon, and Miss Doris Chaplin. A fourth session was devoted to discussion of some of the problems raised.*]

Recent Gains and Present Needs

Twenty years ago there was a radical uncertainty amongst thoughtful parents about the upbringing of children, an uncertainty often disguised as fanatical adherence to positive ideas. To-day the uncertainty has passed over, although for many parents it still clouds the religious outlook which they would like to be able to share with their adolescent children. There has been time to forget the effects of the Mosaic moralism of the Victorian patriarch and to recover from the impact of Freud; and there has been time to digest a great body of results acquired by careful observation and experimental work in child psychology. The developmental sequence is understood well enough to give a measured confidence in dealing with the child (in knowing what is going on and what to do about it) during the early years; until, in dealing with the needs of adolescence, we are embarrassed by our own uncertainties about life, our own lack of orientation and commitment. These contrasted themes recurred throughout the Conference: mastery of the once troublesome problems of early life; anxiety about what to teach the adolescent in place of the Christian faith. But there was also the problem occasioned for humanists by the Christian teaching of children, with which Mrs. Flemming deals in the first paper, and which continually cropped up. This complicates for many a straightforward handling of the problem, according to modern knowledge, in the early years.

Early Training

This contrast of confidence and uncertainty is seen concretely in comparing the two crises of development. The first occurs in the period when the child acquires his early skills, walking and talking, which enable him to emerge from helpless dependence upon the adults of his world and to pit himself against them. This is the time when baby threatens to rule the house. It is the time when according to older prescriptions (the father of liberalism, John

Locke, is one of the doctors) the will must be broken. If that really happens, the child is reduced to subjection and despair; and this outcome is a permanent injury. The better alternative is to win the loving co-operation of the child.

Of course the crisis is not normally a crisis, properly speaking. Things may come to a head in memorable episodes, but it is not an issue which comes up for decision on some occasion once for all. It is normally a cumulative adjustment, and the term crisis is less a faithful description of its dramatic character than the psychologist's indication of what is going on and what is at issue. Moreover, the parents, in particular the mother, who usually has so much more to do with the child at this age, may fail (may shift from the line of winning co-operation to the line of breaking the will) hardly less often, as often, or more often than the child. This means that although the parent is setting the standard and seeking the adjustment of wills, failure on both sides makes each equally subject to the situation; there is need for mutual forbearance and forgiveness, and it is forthcoming; the chequered course of moral endeavour in a close relationship is followed through. It can succeed, and does succeed, because what has to be done and why it has to be done are clear enough. The adjustment falls entirely within the scope of immediate needs and immediate gains. Success solves for both the problem of living together and achieves for both the pleasure of happy relations.

Religious Teaching

The crisis in adolescence is far more complex and is far more likely to remain unresolved. The adolescent is pitting himself not against a home-made world of friendly (if defensive) adults, responsible for his welfare and interested in his development, but against the real world, of which he becomes increasingly aware, indifferent to his aspirations and made formidable by its history and stupendous cosmic background. The element of frustration may be a stimulus to resourceful self-dependence, leading to achievement; or it may altogether dominate, and produce despair, rebellion, or escapism. The element of disillusionment, which comes in when admired adults are seen to be not so wholly good and wise as once they seemed, may bring tolerance, helpfulness, and a keener sense of responsibility, or lead to bitterness and cynicism. On the one hand is this demand for acceptance, moderate expectations, and hard work; on the other, romanticism flares up, emergent vitalities ignited by the new impact of the great world; emotions become all in all, liable to burn out and leave the life unlighted and unwarmed till the end. In a word, although here again there may be no actual drama, what is going on at this time is of incalculable importance both to the individual and to society. Driven into

isolation by the conflicts within him, the adolescent, on the threshold of his career when he should be responding generously with understanding and enthusiasm to the demands of the human cause, all too easily falls, like the convict, into chronic opposition, an embittered critic of society and of the universe, a permanent malcontent.

It is at this time that there is the great need and the great opportunity for religion. Christianity, for example, tries to convince the adolescent that there is another, optimistic, side to the world's appearances, that an all-or-none response is demanded of him: he must decide and commit himself, assured that help abounding will be on his side to see him through. Whatever language is used, whatever doctrines are taught, the issue is universal and the same: is the adolescent going to participate freely, profoundly, and creatively in the natural and social processes and fulfilments which make human life, or will he stand out and apart; will he accept or will he reject? Perhaps most of us do neither; and indeed a commitment once for all cannot be made. But religion helps to force the issue, and gives dramatic urgency and fatefulness to the demand for a commitment, and provides a programme in which the decision is made effective. This in principle is a good thing, since life unquestionably demands, if it is to be worth anything, the consecrated and enthusiastic devotion of human energies. Certainly Humanism can appeal, and has appealed, to the imagination as powerfully as other historical religions. It has a great history and is one of the permanent alternatives. That is the least that can be said. But it must be admitted that Humanism has not been formally developed in recent years, and appears weak-handed and ineffective, lacking the equipment of the organized faiths.

Looking at the moral adjustment which the adolescent has to make, it might seem that the better the home and school, in the sense that they are truly founded upon the child's interests and are adapted to his needs, the more they unfit him for an alien world of society and nature governed by entirely different principles. It is sometimes said that the hard régime of the earlier public schools produced the tough morale which life demands better than do the enlightened schools and homes of to-day. This raises questions which were not discussed at the Conference, and which therefore cannot be pursued in this review. But the substantial point is too challenging to the whole temper and method of modern practice to be altogether avoided. It would be disastrous of course if the discipline inescapably required for real achievement and the moral demands imposed by duties and responsibilities were not made as imperative in schools and homes as they are in the world of mature action; but beyond the wise realism which enforces this discipline,

rough treatment and harsh conditions do far more harm than good. The sympathetic and intelligently adapted environment is far more productive of strong and high development. Humanism demands such conditions, and demands further, as their necessary sequel, complementary conditions in the factories and offices to which the great majority of adolescents go as workers. Humanism means the humanizing of man in society. Unless the actual life lived can be idealized, interpreted, and enjoyed, Humanism has no gospel. It is not other-worldly and it is not utopian. It puts upon human life a sovereign value, but the realization of that value makes exacting demands.

The Humanist's Answer

What then is the answer to the question repeatedly raised during the Conference: what inspiration do humanists offer youth in place of the Christian faith?

Mr. Stapledon (seeming to follow some form of the now popular Existentialism) wanted Humanists to make themselves aware, or allow themselves to become aware, of superhuman issues in which we feel ourselves to be instrumental and for the sake of which we do all that we seriously attempt.

Mrs. Hubback insisted that a standard of values, ideals, a purpose in life, a feeling of belonging, and a sense of security, which, she suggested, were the good things which people looked to religion to give their children, were all provided in the order of good citizenship by the traditions and the demands of a democratic community.

Miss Chaplin let fall a valuable practical hint in speaking of the adolescent's hard adjustment, which she truly said is the battle which we all fight in our own souls all our lives: she said that the adolescent's need to find some sense of solidarity to bring him out of his isolation might be partly met by interesting him in the lives of the great rebels and reformers who had made human progress and with whom he could sympathetically identify himself.

In the long run, Humanism has no answer to these needs, and is merely a utopian form of supernatural religion, unless it accepts and bears witness to the ideal of a civilization which does without religion because it is religious, because it creates a stable and fruitful balance of human interests which can be idealized, interpreted, and enjoyed. Humanists have the confidence to say that they can meet the crisis of youth, because they have the faith that such a civilization can be achieved, that its foundations are being laid, and that the imagination of the young will respond vigorously to the difficult possibilities which it offers, if the appeal is made. Humanism in this respect is a practical job: it is the initiation of

the young into participation in the experience and in the creation of human good. For this, a body of doctrine is no substitute for the material and cultural resources of society which provide the means of good living. All creative workers are humanists and propagate humanism. Where they abound, youth will not lack teaching nor inspiration.

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PARENTS FOR THE RELIGIOUS UPBRINGING OF THEIR CHILDREN

MANY parents who are not themselves Christians feel that believing Christians have in their faith a basis for living which strengthens them for good, makes them happier, and more positive in their conception of life. They therefore feel loth to deprive their children of the faith, because they themselves have no comparable alternative to offer. Even those parents who want to bring up their children in some kind of simple humanist attitude with direct ethical convictions often feel at a loss how to convey it and just what to convey in early years. They find themselves driven by the impact of Christianity upon their little children into what seems a negative and destructive attitude, from which they shrink. They have to deny the loving Father upon whom all the prayers and hymns centre and in whom Jesus believed and in whose name he taught. They cannot use the Gospels without being plunged into acceptance or rejection or "interpretation" of the conception of God. They are inclined to feel that it may be better to let children grow up in the Christian faith and discard what they do not believe later on. Many people feel it is supremely suited to children and can do no harm. A third and large group consists of those who are mildly doubtful and muddled, who do not themselves go to church or pray or think in terms of God and his purpose and his grace, his incarnation and the salvation offered to man, but who are ready to let others instruct their children in the religion which they themselves vaguely feel stands for what is good and right.

Parents must inevitably shoulder the responsibility of being the dominant influence in the shaping of ideas and beliefs as well as in day by day moral education for the first ten years at least of their children's lives. Since parents are the people to whom children feel they belong, on whom they are dependent, and whom they love, parents will in fact be the central influence and any other conflicting and competing one will set up a conflict which is unbearable and insoluble before the middle teens. In the teens conflicting ideas may have to be faced seriously, but any emotional break is highly undesirable during adolescence. Therefore although parents must face the possibility of some mature conversion, they must be

prepared to bring up their children in their own way of thought until they reach maturity. They must have the courage to let their children go forth seeing life in the way they themselves see it.

Parents, then, inevitably as well as consciously, condition the outlook with which their children embark on life; our parents form part of our unique fate. Recognizing the strength of this influence it may be necessary to protect children from the influence of a vital person teaching conflicting beliefs, especially at an early age; and if the teaching of religion in schools gets into the hands of really keen and competent people (which is the intention under the Education Act), the question of withdrawing children from Scripture lessons may become acute for Humanist parents. This does not mean that the children should not become acquainted, and deeply acquainted, with the Bible and with Christian thought, and should not feel free to use the ideas and images which appeal to them as well as learning from the spiritual truths embodied in the teaching. They can do this happily while knowing, increasingly, what their parents really think. Harmful conflict only arises for young children as a rule when beloved persons present contradictory ideas in a compelling way. In order to prepare the child for contact with Christian ideas, these should be presented at home before the child's fourth Christmas at latest and the impression created that Jesus is revered, though gradually it can be brought home that parents do not believe in God. If the teachers then realized sympathetically what kind of homes the children they teach came from, a really fruitful harmony might be established. But children, teachers and parents will have infinitely varying individualities, and no rule could be laid down.

The essential thing is that parents lay hold of whatever convictions really shape their lives, or what they think should shape their lives. These convictions may be very simple ones about the good and bad potentialities of human nature and human societies, and how the good potentialities can be cherished and the bad avoided or overcome. They will be a blend of factual knowledge and value judgements. It is these operative convictions which must be consciously seized and recognized as a positive faith about how to live based on knowledge of human nature and the whole world in which we live.

There seems no doubt that a sound development up to adolescence can be carried through without the support of anything like an explicit philosophy. The chief theoretical trouble comes from the impact of Christianity, which aims at making small children think constantly of the loving Creator who came to earth as the baby Jesus. Apart from that, the child will become absorbed in the world as given, accepting that no final explanation of its being

so is forthcoming. It will enjoy beauty, be interested in how everything happens, in cause and effect, in why things are done. It will adapt itself (not without conflict) to social life, seeing directly the claims of others and the need for justice, appreciating kindness and courage, and seeing the need for truthfulness. It will naturally display considerable sympathy and reflect wisely upon experience, and will enjoy making and doing things. All of which is consistent with uncontrollably strong desires at any moment which lead to selfish inconsiderateness and conflict. But the claims of right action need no transcendent authority or justification to small children. Moreover, they naturally apply the principles which they have accepted in their immediate experience to wider spheres. They are able to learn something of how to accept frustration and sorrow and still to find something good and interesting to do or work for.

By the time they reach adolescence such children will have the root of the matter in them and will surely find that they have faith, even if they cannot justify that faith with an unchallengeable philosophy. They will have moral conviction about how men should live. Theories come and go, but those who cannot help seeing their fellow men as persons with feelings, needs, and minds; those who feel the iniquity of indifference as of cruelty; those to whom perversion of the truth is monstrous, and careful adherence to truth a habit approved by judgement; those who are used to shouldering responsibility in the life around them; those whose joy in beauty has been cherished and developed: such people will feel that they have ends to pursue which will make experience rich even in adversity. Such people will surely evolve theories or beliefs to match life as they experience it. And that is what our children, when mature, should do. In adolescence they will need help chiefly to become courageous creators of what is good, when they feel the full blast of adverse situations. They will need to recognize consciously that however bad the world is, it would be infinitely worse in every way if some people did not aim heroically at creating a good life; and, on the other hand, that those who so strive reach a fulfilment in themselves which does not wait upon the coming of what they work for. These two principles will guard them from despair, without inducing false expectations. This does not mean they should not have realistic hopes.

Surely "non-believing" parents can be brought to see that to bring up their children thus is a highly positive undertaking about which they should not be half-hearted. They should feel, moreover, a call to share in building up a common, positive tradition of humanist education, for it is a task crying out to be done.

VIRGINIA FLEMMING

THE AIMS AND CONTENTS OF RELIGIOUS TEACHING AND MORAL TRAINING ON HUMANIST ASSUMPTIONS

Moral Habits

MORALISTS (for example, Aristotle) have recognized that the habits of the citizens are more fundamental to the community than the laws of the State. Bacon remarks, "the ancient wisdom of the best times did always make a just complaint that States were too busy with their laws and too negligent in point of education." Habits are dependable, that is to say predictable, forms of behaviour. We want people to behave dependably, to do what is reasonably expected of them in all the relations of life. That is not exciting, but it is basic; it is the condition of more exciting possibilities. What habits do we want to inculcate in children?

We might try to be comprehensive; we might take all the listed virtues and classify them: as virtues making for personal efficiency, like courage, patience, prudence, perseverance, temperance; virtues making for reliability, like truth-speaking, honesty, loyalty; virtues making for social acceptability, like modesty, and the important branch of minor morals which we call manners. We might exercise our children in each of these groups. Can it be done—profitably? Pericles in his famous funeral oration says of the Spartans: "They toil from early boyhood in a laborious pursuit after courage, while we, free to live and wander as we please, march out none the less to face the self-same dangers . . . . if we choose to face danger with an easy mind rather than after a rigorous training, and to trust rather in native manliness than in State-made courage, the advantage lies with us; for we are spared all the weariness of practising for future hardships, and when we find ourselves amongst them we are as brave as our plodding rivals." Can we reasonably expect desirable qualities to manifest themselves without rehearsal when they are wanted?

The prescription offered by Lord Bacon suggests a third alternative: "If these two things be supposed, that a man set before him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute, constant and true unto them: it will follow that he shall mould himself into all virtue at once . . . . So, in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like. But when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look, what virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto." The principle is ethically and psychologically sound: ethically, because virtues are not ends in themselves, to be practised for their own sake; psychologically, because there is no evidence that formal training in general qualities is effective.

What we have to do, then, is to get children to pursue ends, to follow up and develop their interests, and they will learn to respond with the qualities demanded for the attainment of their ends. But the child is infinitely distractable and easily discouraged. Unless he is helped and directed, he will not hold to one interest and acquire the means to develop it. If a child starts something (a line of inquiry or a practical job), it is not by any means always sensible to insist on his seeing it through. Children start so many things they are not equal to. But when something is started which is a suitable undertaking for which the child has aptitude, then make him see it through, and see him through it. He has to be put in the way of completing the successive stages and of making himself equal to the growing demands of what he has undertaken; so that he gains a sense of competence and knows the rewarding taste of achievement. It is up to parents to give guidance, help, and encouragement in this way, in order to establish for the child standards of self-reliance and achievement in the gaining of ends. What ends? Does it matter? It does. They should be natural interests (practical, intellectual, or aesthetic) within the child's competence, and not borrowed from the grown-up world. Even the encouragement of such natural interests may be highly injudicious. For example, the encouragement of boxing prowess in boys' clubs (because it promotes "clean living") has had in some cases the unfortunate effect of conspicuously increasing the pugnacious reaction in social intercourse. What is mainly asked of parents under this head is a keen and wise interest in and knowledge of the child's school career: what the child is doing and aiming at in work, athletics, friendships, and social life. It is for the parents to help him to take and tackle things realistically, to play a worthy part and achieve his ends.

Moral Relations

Most people, not being moralists, when they think about morals stress the personal obligations of the general relation in which we stand to one another as human beings; truth-speaking, promise-keeping, honesty, and the like. But the essence of moral responsibility, and the structure of interdependent interests, which is the basis of morals, is more clearly seen and effectively brought home in specific relations with their special obligations. In every such relation (in this case, we are specially concerned with the relation between husband and wife and between parents and children), there is on both sides a body of particular expectations in virtue of the relation, as well as the body of general expectations in virtue of our relation as fellow human beings. Many of such expectations are commonly unfulfilled or half-fulfilled; many are romantic, wishful, or perverse. On their being on all sides both well-grounded and

faithfully fulfilled depends the success of human living. Intelligence, sensitiveness, and courage in this are of supreme importance.

What are the parents' reasonable expectations of their children? The child has no functions upon which the parents are dependent; therefore what is reasonably to be expected of children has to be indicated negatively. In our anxiety to make the child equal to his coming responsibilities, we have to be careful not to expect too much of him. We have to work within the framework of his own scope and interests. He is not a little adult, and if he is treated as one the damage is great. The times are serious and ours is an anxious generation, and therefore the warning is necessary. In Germany, where this mistake was made, the reaction produced a powerful youth movement which was not healthy and nourished a pernicious romanticism. Solemn treatment apart, lying, cruelty, rage, selfishness, and the like naturally excite dismay in the parents, with the result that they are immediately ready to take strong action to prevent their children from going to the bad; but this behaviour is not the same thing in children as in adults. Of course, it has to be dealt with; but indirectly.

False expectations of the child's career do harm; for example, that he shall make a name for himself or a fortune. We should be fully satisfied with honest, useful careers for our children, suited to their capacities and aptitudes and in which they can be happy; nevertheless, we should pointedly expect devotion and real achievement. In Victorian families, the daughter who was expected to remain at home and sacrifice independent interests entirely to the duty of comforting the declining years of her parents was grievously wronged. Children are entitled to real, unshadowed independence; they should not be expected to play parts assigned to them in the dreams of their parents.

The child is dependent upon the functions of his parents and has legitimate expectations, expressed as needs. He needs help and personal sympathy, means for the development and pursuit of his interests, leisure and room to grow, freedom from fussy, unnecessary interference; above all, in the last resort, and expressing the essence of his deepest need, a loyalty that will stand by him and never let him go. He has also a host of false expectations, and these are the ones that are to the fore and get fully expressed, for parents are looked to as the fountain of abundance for the satisfaction of all wishes. Here the child has to be early disillusioned and brought down to modest and reasonable hopes.

If the child's genuine needs are fully met, and his false expectations severely discouraged, and if parents, on their part, eschew false expectations, then, on these conditions, they are entitled to expect real obedience and co-operation and good performance; and

these very expectations, pressed home in genuine interest, criticism, encouragement, and understanding guidance, have an immense formative influence. In this way the moral self is created. If things go wrong here and parents and children are looking at each other with false expectations, or failing to fulfil those which are proper to their relation, there can only be resentment, frustration, and conflict, resulting inevitably in damage for life. No child comes out of such a situation unscathed.

Further, the same principle holds between the parents. If they have no false expectations of each other and amply fulfil the bracing positive expectations which they legitimately have, they are able to rise above the tasks of daily living and to become, as it were, free from and for each other. The family is a model of lives built upon and into one another. Other forms of association are more creative, but this one is basic, normalizing, and morally all important. The meaning and conditions of its success can be made the child's most genuine possession and ideal for life. And he needs the solidarity, the close identification with a life beyond his own which it provides.

Moral Ideals

The moral ideal in its social aspect can be regarded as the reconciliation and fruitful union of diverse interests. From the point of view of the individual, this means the reconciliation of self-interest with the interests of others and the public interest. The problem for parents is how to make these interests concrete in a form which makes them easily reconcilable. If self-interest means making a fortune, and public interest paying taxes, there is not much hope. In classical antiquity, virtue meant the overriding command of the public interest. "They spend their bodies, as mere external tools, in the City's service, and count their minds as most truly their own when employed on her behalf." Athens was there, a palpable, physical presence; she was lovely and she was loved. In so far as the devotion which she excited brought the best out of her citizens, the products of their free association enriched their lives and set their standards, and it was the city which was the concrete embodiment of all interests, the core of all meaning. Patriotism has its roots in early physical sensations and is fed by concrete knowledge of the land. The modern planning approach to social reconstruction and development offers an opportunity not to be missed of fixing the child's interest in the tangible public means of good living.

Self-interest has to be made concrete in the career; at first, the school career. It is in the prospect of solid achievement, and the discovery of its conditions and its meaning, that the way of reconciliation is found. Children find their careers a dominant interest

in their later school years. They have to learn, and they have to be helped, to find their proper place in the world and to play their proper part. Parents can help them to get over the painful extravagance of ambition and to find uncommon satisfaction in genuine usefulness, founded upon high standards of good performance.

Consideration for the interests of others is rightfully founded upon what is due to them, rather than upon a sentimental feeling of universal kindness; and children should early be taught to recognize and have regard to what is fair and right in this way, both in respect of persons and of classes, for example, the aged or the suffering. A regardless pursuit of self-interest is checked by attention to the defined interests of others better than by a cult of kindness.

The Moral Training

All that has been said amounts merely to a few plain principles governing the parents' part in the moral training of children. The school has a different and in some respects a more elaborate part to play. The parents' part is simple and natural, but that does not mean it is easy to carry out; it makes great demands, and it is impossible to be fully equal to them. The essence of the job is in its restraint, in what it does not attempt to do. In its modesty is its strength and effectiveness.

The Religious Upbringing

The moral training neither needs nor is helped by theology. It is all direct, and firmly self-sufficient. Religious teaching for humanists in the early years can be nothing other than generalized science, the account of the world in all its major aspects in the first outline. From the earliest years of intelligible talk the child is ready to form some picture of the world and to get a sense of its history. He is ready for the pictorial generalizations of the main sciences, and to take interest in the way things are and how they happen, as they fall under observation.

The serious demand for an interpretation comes later, in adolescence. The adolescent may come to feel that if there is not the purpose in the universe which Christians affirm, human life is pointless. Yet belief in the purpose of God can only mean that there is a guarantee that the universe is capable of being enjoyed as a whole and that we are ultimately capable of enjoying it. Humanists affirm that the organized world of nature and man in our active experience is capable of being enjoyed as a whole; and the doctrines of humanism are signposts to the creation and the experience of this objective world. "Nothing," says Epicurus, "nothing is sufficient for him to whom what is sufficient seems little." If we think little of natural beauty and works of art, and

are lukewarm in friendship, and are not interested enough to gain and use knowledge for the experience of things: then nothing can be more certain than that we are in principle incapable of a responsive, satisfying life; and we may as well say our *Nunc dimittis,* for we can absolutely know that there is nothing for us in unknown fate. But for those whose affections are not congealed, spiritual possession of natural fulfilments is a final and sufficient enjoyment which makes sacred the whole fabric of civilization and enjoins devoted care for the due order which sustains the manifold good.

Any religion offers its richest prizes to heroic souls, and leaves plenty and more than enough for ordinary mortals to pick up. The ordinary humanist may well be content with the natural pieties of home and city and native heath, the moral union of creative association with others, the overtones and undertones of sensation in quiet, detached daily living, the inward peace which comes from honesty and openness, genuine achievement, and modest desires. It is parents above all others who can best secure these blessings to their children; and it is such things above all others for which children have always blessed their parents. H. J. BLACKHAM

THE PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATE METHODS AND MATERIALS

The Early Years

In the very young we are dealing primarily with a self-centred bundle of emotions which are only under slight control and which may take complete command of the child's whole being at any moment, so that he tends to cling to parent or teacher and to be utterly dependent on them, not only for material protection but also against the flood of his own feelings. We must bear in mind, too, that *any* of the emotions can take control, love and hate, joy and sorrow, fear and anger; whether by adult standards we call them good or bad, they are neither to the small child: they just happen. And when his own feelings frighten him the only rock on which he can depend is the parent or the teacher. So it is small wonder that his later ideas of authority and dependence—ideas which play a great part in our thinking about Deity—are often highly coloured by his early experiences in relation to the adults he knows. If they fail him then, he may be lost indeed.

What then should we do for him? He has two main needs: for security in a bewilderingly strange world, and for affection. These, adults only can supply in the early years; he will not get them from his playmates. He merely uses his fellows in his play according to his needs; we can see that when we watch the spontaneous and rapidly changing groupings of small children at play:

it is to adults he turns when he is "in a jam." What we have to do, then, is to give him security and affection, and to respect his individuality—that he has an individual personality at a very early age every mother of several children knows. If we can supply these things we are laying a foundation on which he can build a view of the world and of his relationship with it and with his fellow beings which will be kindly, charitable and purposeful. But if his adults fail him when he is very young, if they are not there when he urgently needs them, if their behaviour is capricious or vengeful, then, as his views grow and he begins to think in terms of wider values and higher authorities, he may well be influenced adversely by his early experiences.

In no way, it seems to me, is a young child more easily harmed than by too early an attempt to cultivate a "moral sense." He is, as I have said, at the mercy of his emotions and much of his early social development is taken up with learning how to control them so as to get on with adults and with contemporaries. More than that we should not expect: to expect him to have standards about right and wrong or about good and bad before he wants himself to know what they mean is to burden him too heavily. To a nursery child, "naughty" is what makes grown-ups angry, "good" is what pleases grown-ups; and we should not ask him for more. If we do ask him for more we are in danger of turning him into an anxious little prig. Behaviour in the early years is determined by personal fears and affections and not by moral ideas, and to attempt to instil any moral code of behaviour is to load him with more fears than the many he already has to cope with. The intractableness of material things like bricks and tables and chairs, the see-saw which needs another willing child at the other end, the swing at which you have to wait your turn, the climbing-frame where you may get hurt if someone pushes you off so it is just as well not to push anyone else off: these are the elementary tools and materials through which a small child learns the first crude fundamentals of moral behaviour.

Group Behaviour

As the years go on, changes begin to take place in his emotional development. The violent expressions of feeling characteristic of infancy slowly become more and more controlled; slowly he becomes less dependent on the adult, and slowly he begins to find more and more satisfaction and more permanent ties among those of his own age. About the age of seven, though there are, of course, wide differences, infantile characteristics have largely disappeared and the boy or girl proper is there. Instead of spontaneous and changing contacts with other children, he belongs to a lasting gang or clique to which he is often closely attached by common tastes,

common adventures, or even by elaborate ritual. The spontaneous animosities of earlier groups, too, have changed into the organised rivalries of class, team or school.

And often the child becomes extraordinarily independent of the adult, finding apparently much of the social satisfaction he wants in the companionship of his fellows. Parents sometimes feel at this stage that they are rather left out in the cold. Though now he will respect his elders and be friends with them, he will seldom be really intimate. We should not expect to experience the intense emotional intimacy we attain with younger children, and he is embarrassed if we try to make him show that he feels deeply. All we can do during this so-called "latency" period (that is, roughly, from seven to eleven), is to play the part of sensible, decent, friendly, but perhaps remote, elders. All he wants from us is that we should be free from humbug and tyranny, and especially that we should not be afraid of him, which we sometimes are. If we can be these things to him, he will be content and he will happily go on exploring his own exciting world.

This world of his, too, is coming much nearer to our own world. The wild phantasies of infancy embodied in fairy stories are changing to the more exciting aspects of reality. Fairy godmothers give place to cowboys and Indians or, less happily, perhaps, to gangsters in his wildly active group games. And it is in these group games, I think, that we can see the early beginnings of a moral code. Gang loyalty in boys is often very intense; so is devotion to the leader, who demands and obtains whole-hearted obedience. The genius of the Scout movement is that it found a way to harness these characteristics and to weld them into a socially acceptable code. But any method of harnessing this group spirit in a creative way will help. Games and sports, co-operative tasks in arts and crafts, anything active which the group can do as a group adds to the sense of purpose and of belonging. Within limits, too, individuals can wield responsibility, but I doubt if at this stage they should shoulder much; group responsibility is likely to be much more powerful and lasting.

What shall we say concerning the intense rivalry which occurs between groups? Is this to be encouraged as contributing towards an ultimately sound community sense, or is it to be deplored as the germ of that international rivalry and fear which we all deplore? I believe that in any case it cannot be avoided: if a gang of boys has no real enemy it will tend to invent an imaginary one. Of course, we must interfere when fights become dangerous or when intolerance of one group or individual by another becomes excessive. We must still protect at times just as we have to do in infancy. But I think our wisest course is to wait for further

growth before expecting that the virtues of loyalty, kindliness, generosity and tolerance should be extended beyond a rather narrow field.

And I certainly believe that formal lectures on the moral or religious aspects of behaviour are still out of place among the sevens to elevens. They are not yet at the stage when abstract thought comes easily to them; they live an active life in the concrete and the present, and until they reach the next stage of adolescence, the principle of the thing tends to go in at one ear and out of the other. At least, I always feel that seven to eleven is the most "unlecturable-to" age I know. But they are, I think, well able to assimilate and to enjoy stories and accounts, particularly of real people, which represent to them ideals and behaviour in accordance with their own active, adventurous group experiences. Explorers, pioneers, fighters against wrong or oppression, deliverers from injustice; stories from mythology and saga, some from the Old Testament, and possibly some of the parables: these seem to me to be the right material at this stage. And I would point out that other kinds of formal education which stress individual competition and individual success, such as hours of Latin at a desk for "Common Entrance," or hours of formal arithmetic for the eleven-plus examination, are running contrary to the natural interests of the child as far as moral training is concerned. His need at this stage is for group activity, group work, group play, song and dance and drama, anything that fosters "togetherness" and which gives him practical, *active* experience of co-operation, loyalty and tolerance.

Adolescence

The problem of the adolescent is a very different one. In adolescence there is a tremendous broadening and deepening both of the emotional and the intellectual life, the essential element of which is that of adjustment, often with some difficulty, to maturity. Now there are certain features of this adjustment which we need to bear in mind in considering moral training.

In the first place, an unstable transitional phase between youth and maturity is characteristic of all higher animals. They all normally get through it, but in human beings the transition period is a long one and the process *should* be slow. Therefore to be in school one day and in a job the next as an adult is bound to encourage disturbances.

Secondly, the wide variations, intellectual, emotional, and moral, between human beings reach their maximum at this stage. We must allow here for the widest varieties of treatment between one boy or girl and another.

Thirdly, intellectual maturity and progress, which again reach their maximum development, must be allowed for. Abstract

thought now lies within the powers of the boy or girl, discussions of principle become possible; and with these new-found abilities comes an intense curiosity and desire to criticise the adult beliefs and standards which they are expected to adopt. Ethical standards particularly come under the fire of criticism, and the only way to help is by sound intellectual preparation and by free and frank discussion of such standards and principles.

What, then, does the adolescent need to help him to develop a satisfying and satisfactory moral outlook?

He needs, I believe, first and foremost a more appropriate type of education. He should not be overburdened either by intense and competitive intellectual pressure at school, or by the equally competitive and often unprogressive environment of his first job. He needs to be in a community which encourages initiative and responsibility and which fosters all kinds of corporate activity. Unless his community, whether in school or at work, provides help through its own moral standards, he is bound to become critical and cynical. It is to this point of view that I would give greatest weight in choosing a school for the adolescent, for it seems to me that if you place him in a community which preaches love and neighbourliness and which at the same time encourages individual competition and maintains order through the use of force you can only expect to produce eventually a more or less complete indifference to any form of ethical feeling.

He needs, too, an outlet for every aspect of his personality, of which the intellectual and the moral are only two. There are also the emotional and artistic channels, and physical and manipulative interests. But though all these activities are to be encouraged, in adolescence interests and hobbies are exceedingly unstable. They are a restless kind of experimentation, and therefore they should not be criticized for their apparent instability.

Again, it seems to me that if we are to give him a sound foundation on which he can build his own system of religious or ethical beliefs, we must give him a view of the universe based on the vast discoveries and methods of science. Whether he is going to be a humanist or not, he must know what science has to say about the place of man in the cosmos, both in place and time. He must be in a position to try to fit that scientific view into his own personal scheme of things. Unless he knows something of this problem he will tend to feel that ethics and religion have been superseded by science, and he will end by knowing and feeling little about either.

Finally, the adolescent has great need for guidance and advice on the innumerable social, personal and sexual problems which confront him. These loom large on his horizon and he is often

torn between the desire for help over them and the feeling that he must be responsible for his own actions. He is therefore often resistant to advice if it is given in the tone of, "I am older than you and therefore know better." I am sure that the effective way of helping him is to treat him as an adult, to give him opposing views on a problem, to show him the view you yourself take as a result of your own experience, but to offer him the responsibility of making his own final decisions about it.

So far I have largely avoided the question of religious instruction, as distinct from moral training, whether such instruction is in the form of giving information about religion or whether it is in the form of imparting specific dogma. My own feelings about the first possibility is that knowledge of the fact that man has always been religious is an essential part of human knowledge that everyone should have; and some information about the forms and beliefs through which man has tried to express his feelings of universality should always be given to children. But I doubt if such information can be given before the age of adolescence, for before that age the ideas involved are usually beyond the grasp of the child.

In Western Europe, too, we cannot break away all of a sudden from our common Christian tradition, for it is far too deeply embedded in our social structure. Our own language and folklore are full of Bible influences, and the fact that every village has a church itself gives a child information about religion. Whether the Bible should be used as a source of religious information or merely as literature seems to me to be without meaning, for you cannot use it for one purpose without using it for the other. But it is unthinkable to me that such a storehouse of high ideals, literary beauty, and of the historical development of religious thought should not be used in case it conflicts with modern adult beliefs. One cannot ignore a belief or a theory just because it might be erroneous. If parents or teachers believe in a dogma, and equally if they do not, then I am sure that the only thing to do is to be honest. But it is not always easy. Perhaps the best we can do for the child is to see that the right information is put before him at each stage of his growth—right, that is, in the sense of assimilable and intelligible, corresponding to the level of his intellectual and emotional development. To try to "force" him, by giving him stimuli that are beyond his age, is to produce either one-sided development or eventual revolt. In our contacts with young people we must move with them as they move. And we must always bear in mind that true religion and a sound moral sense cannot be imposed from without, but spring from within, from the latent creativity which exists, however obscurely, in every individual soul.

H. A. T. CHILD

BOOK REVIEWS

MYTH AND RITUAL IN DANCE, GAME AND RHYME. By Lewis Spence, pp. vii, 202, 20 plates. Watts, 1947, 12s. 6d.

Mr. Spence has written a number of books on folk-lore and mythology and his present task is to trace the religious element in certain popular activities. He wishes incidentally to show that "psychological factors," upon which some writers place undue importance, especially in discussing dancing, are too vague and inexact to apply to the processes of primitive thought.

The book deals first with games, then with dancing, and finally with some popular rhymes. Mr. Spence ranges over the five continents for his facts and has illustrated them with a number of excellent plates. Of special interest are his answers to such problems as "Did Robin Hood ever exist? What was the significance of the Mistletoe to the Druid? And why is April the first the proper day for making fools of others?" An account is given also of the Maypole, of Jack-in-the-Green, which scared the reviewer at Norwich, when he was a small boy; but the Dragon, which he also used to see parading the town, is not mentioned.

The explanation of April Fools' Day is particularly interesting. It is conected with the appearance of the cuckoo at the beginning of April and with the North of England custom of "hunting the gowk (i.e., cuckoo)". There was an early belief that the gowk was in reality a fairy, and, just as you could find a pot of gold where the rainbow meets the ground, so you could catch the fairy princess, if you could track down the first cuckoo.

From a scientific point of view, the book is of less value. No fault is to be found with the facts, which are derived from good authorities and are well presented, but the conclusions are often merely speculative and the author has too often succumbed to the fatal lure of etymology. He is also often tempted to make general statements which are obviously incorrect and conflict with earlier statements. For instance he writes, "In no sense does a game differ in its origin from a rite." What he means is "Games are not infrequently survivals of religious ritual," as he says in effect in the introductory chapter. There is no reason to suppose that the communal games of football at Inveresk or Alnwick or the game of stool-ball are religious in origin.

Mr. Spence is on much safer ground as regards dancing. He does, however, neglect one point. Dancing in honour of a god is not necessarily religious in origin. People danced to amuse themselves. They would naturally dance to amuse the god, or to do him honour. Just as people ate food and drank, before they thought of offering food and drink to the gods, so it is likely that they danced before they danced for the gods. And so the investigator cannot assume that a dance was religious in origin merely because it was,

on occasions, performed as part of a religious rite. The whole point of the fable of the Jongleur de Notre Dame was that his only possible offering was a wholly secular acrobatic performance.

As an Indianist the reviewer must regret the meagre references made to Indian dancing. Secular dancing is often mentioned in the classics. The King in the Malavikagnimitra of Kalidasa has two professors of dancing to train his own and the Queen's attendants. The nautch-girls, however, have nothing to do with religion and there is nothing in the author's description of the *devadasis* to show that their dancing in temples was developed from a religious ritual and was not merely part of the service due to a venerated being of the status of a ruler. It is no accident that kings are addressed as gods. But there were dances which may be considered as religious. The great god Siva (Mahadeva) is often represented dancing the Tandava or Dance of Death on the burning ground amid destruction and decay. It is an expression of divine energy, in its purest aspect directed to the eradication of evil. The dance of his consort Parvati, the lasya, is, on the contrary, restrained and even languid and is erotic in character. One of the dancing professors of the Malavikagnimitra declares that dancing is, as sages say, a sacrificial feast pleasing to the gods, expressing as it does the three qualities: goodness, passion and darkness. Dancing in this 1,500 years old play includes mime, and is said to be the chief amusement of mankind. Here once more it is regarded as being incidentally rather than in essence religious. The dance of Krishna with the milk-maids is clearly erotic and probably based rather on folk tales relating to a deified hero than on a religious ritual.

But can one distinguish between dances in the honour of a god and dances of the fertility order? Yes, for the former is merely an act of service, while the latter is an act of magic to compel the occurrence of a particular event. Many Vedic hymns and some of the nursery rhymes occurring in the latter portion of this book are charms of this kind. But it is essential to make quite clear to what categories of activity the term "religious" should properly be applied and this problem the author has not succeeded in solving. Thus, though the book may irritate the serious student, to those who are attracted by curious, outlandish and old-world incidents and customs, and prefer their science tempered by fancy, it will prove a great source of entertainment. ALFRED MASTER

Population, Psychology, and Peace. By J. C. Flugel. Watts & Co. 2s. 6d.

This most readable work constitutes a re-examination and reaffirmation of the Malthusian doctrine. Dr. Flugel analyses with care the arguments in the economic sphere that have been held to invalidate the theory of the necessity of birth control, and

unearths the psychological factors in the unconscious that form the hidden motivation for so much of the resistance to it.

There is no doubt of the validity of the assumption that births must be restricted. A simple calculation which takes into account the average maximum reproduction rate of woman multiplied by a few generations and which allows for the high survival rate rendered possible by modern hygiene and medicine will show that there can be no reasonable doubt of this. It is true that discoveries in chemistry since the time of Malthus and the world-wide development of transport have considerably modified the total amount of food available, and in consequence the total maximum population that can be adequately nourished. But only relatively so. Another consideration that is often lost sight of is the availability of raw materials other than foodstuffs. Foodstuffs are not the only criterion of needs.

The author stresses the point that the raising of the standard of living in those countries where this has happened occurred after birth restriction and not before. This is a very important point. Improvement in productive technique in agriculture in those countries where this has occurred without the practice of birth control (India is an example) has simply led to a larger population of starving people. It is a fortunate fact that restriction of births is a condition of cultural achievement, for otherwise quantity would defeat quality.

It is also worth remembering when people talk loosely of the endless power to produce foodstuffs that large tracts of country in the Middle East, Africa, America have been and are being turned into deserts by overstocking of animals in an endeavour to produce more than can properly be done.

The section in which the author deals with the psychological barriers to an acceptance of restriction of populations is particularly illuminating. Fertility and virility are almost interchangeable terms in the consciousness of man, and in the unconscious there is a "castration" complex which reacts powerfully against any suggestion of restriction. There is also a childish belief in personal immunity from the laws of nature, which is extended to the state. Others may starve, but not me, is a common attitude. The author also lists the tendency to find human scapegoats for any ill happening (a modern form of which is blaming the "capitalist" for all shortcomings and calamities) quite apart from whether such people have any control over the phenomena resented. The part played by manpower in the field in war is probably still overestimated by comparison with the importance of the technical capacity of industry. India and China would be the two leading world powers were manpower the major determining factor.

The author gives but passing attention to those nations with

either a declining or potentially declining population. He expresses himself as confident that the increasing philo-progenitiveness of the survivors in a declining population, and economic factors such as full employment, will allay such decline before it reaches a dangerous level. There is little reason to expect that the extinction of *homo sapiens* will come about through the refusal to exercise the parental role. M.L.B.

The Challenge of Humanism. Report of a Public Conference in London. Published by The World Union of Freethinkers, pp. 64, 2s. 6d.

Both those people who attended the conference last spring and those who did not will be glad of the chance to buy this report in which the speeches, reduced to half their length, retain their quality and substance.

The syllabus excites hopes that the conference will fill in its outline with concrete descriptions of what humanism can mean to the contemporary individual. Professor Heath, Professor Levy, Dr. Stark Murray, and Mr. Charles Duff talked of what modern humanists have in their power to do. Mr. Katz stood apart on a different line, making us properly aware of man's need for a satisfactory vision of his relation to this "inhospitable" world; a vision which humanism can give.

Professor Haldane and Mr. Blackham put in our hands something we can actually have in immediate experience: Professor Haldane by giving some part of a conception of nature in regard to which we may find our bearings and our peace; and Mr. Blackham by indicating a view of human living through which we may do likewise. If such views were a part of ourselves it would be present feeling rather than hopes of the future which would goad us into reshaping the world. U.E.

Yugoslavia Faces the Future. A report by James Klugman, Betty Wallace, Doreen Warriner, and K. Zilliacus, M.P. The British-Yugoslav Association, 1s.

The Trial of Dr. Aloysius Stepinac. By Betty Wallace. The British-Yugoslav Association, 6d.

The contribution of the Yugoslav Partisans to the defeat of the Nazis was probably greater in proportion to their strength than that of any people who fought with the United Nations. And the devastation and loss of life inflicted on Yugoslavia by the war probably exceeded in proportion the suffering of any other country. Such sacrifices are soon forgotten when the crisis has passed and when prejudice closes the mind. The Yugoslavs have not had here as good a Press as they deserve. These and future publications of the British-Yugoslav Association are much needed in this country.

Those who hate and fear Communism (and there are many good reasons for doing so), if they read the report by four British friends of Yugoslavia, two of them leading officials of the UNRRA Yugoslav Mission, will no doubt find the weak places in the armour of these champions. But it is far more important to recognize for what they are worth the undeniable achievements of the Yugoslav people who responded to Communist leadership. It is not going too far to say that those who are in power in Yugoslavia to-day and their administration and supporters have a stronger and prouder title to represent and to reconstruct the country than the mandate given to them by election—although the election may be accepted as the most genuine that Yugoslavia has ever had. By initiating and organizing the will to resistance and forming local administrations out of their supporters, the Communists re-created the nation after the betrayal and liquidation of the State, and carried on a long and telling campaign with appalling suffering and miserable resources against overwhelming odds. And since the war they have consolidated that achievement in the federal union of the nation under popular government. Knowledge of pre-war Yugoslavia makes the very notion of national union and popular government incredible. Knowledge of what Communism is makes the statement ironical. But it would be a great mistake in this case to trust to these preconceptions. There can be no reasonable doubt that something very like national union and popular government have been achieved. Let us agree to leave the judgment to history: we shall see.

Meanwhile, if we let the long history of our own exceptional institutions unfit us for appreciating achievements of another kind, our virtues turn sour and we make ourselves odious. That is a kind of insularity which we cannot afford in our present position. We shall have to draw nearer to Europe. We shall have to understand Europe and to be acceptable to Europe. That ought to be one of the important lessons we learn from our economic crisis. It has been the moral drawn by some of the acutest and most experienced of the American observers. There are amongst us quite a few fanatical partisans of the Communist states. There are others who are hardening into bitter hostility to Communism and all its works. Neither party helps our rôle in Europe. Even the "good European" is not good enough for present purposes. A sentiment for the unity and the urbanity of European culture does not predispose him to accept and therefore does not enable him to influence the sort of change which is inevitable. We have nothing to teach the new Communist states if we think we have nothing to learn from them. Let us, anyhow, see how far we get by making a sympathetic approach and building up positive knowledge. That

sounds, and is, elementary. There is conspicuously little evidence of it in practice. We think we know all about Communism. Let us start again, and start with Yugoslavia. H. J. B.

Correspondence on articles and letters in the previous issue of "The Plain View"

THE PROFIT MOTIVE

John Ruskin in "Unto This Last" castigated the economists of his day for their lack of clear definitions of wealth before they set out to determine the manner of its acquisition and distribution. Mr. Master excuses Mr. Polanyi for his omission to define profit, the subject of his article, and criticises me for my admittedly amateur attempt to supply the omission. I do not feel the need to defend my short definition, which was designed to bring out the ethical implications with which I assumed we were primarily concerned. Nothing that Mr. Master says destroys the fundamental truth that the extra value that we call "profit" is fundamentally derived from labour, and the fact that it is sometimes abnormally swollen by favourable natural circumstances or the exceptional needs of the community only accentuates the injustice of the claim to this surplus value by the property owner who has done nothing to create it.

Mr. Master gives further evidence of not having clearly thought out this matter by referring to burglary and gambling, which quite obviously bear out my condemnation of the process of getting something for nothing, and in wrongly fastening on me the suggestion of "dividing" the "surplus" among the workers where equally obviously my point simply was that surplus value is a *communal* product of labour, and not due to a functionless owner. If we are making an ethical analysis of these matters, surely the whole point is whether the owner is entitled as of *right* to the profit which labour produces and which may be increased, as Mr. Master illustrates, by natural fortune or buyers' competition. To talk of "depriving" the owner of profit begs the whole question. What exactly Mr. Master means by the sentence, "There may be good reasons for depriving him (the owner) of the economic power but if he has the power he has a right to the profit," I do not know.

Another sentence that eludes my understanding is: "I do not agree that the profit motive is based upon a class-divided society *except accidentally*." If Mr. Master has not been convinced by his experience that the economic class structure in this and most capitalist countries is fundamentally inconsistent with ethical social life then nothing I can say will alter his outlook. I should have thought too that it was a logical inference that the dissolution of the class structure would lead to the eradication (naturally gradu-

ally) of class consciousness, but Mr. Master thinks otherwise and I must leave the matter there.

I do not know Latin and so the significance of Mr. Master's concluding observation is lost upon me as on most readers, but it sounds suspiciously like a thrusting away of inconvenient thoughts.

The very interesting articles by Prof. Sargant Florence and Mr. C. B. Frisby suffer, like the preceding ones, from this lack of precise definition of "profit." It seems to me that what these writers are concerned about is the reward for economic activity and that they assume some kind of function on the part of those who claim it. This is rather a different thing from the ordinary man's conception of profit as the drawings from the proceeds of industry of a functionless class of owners, and it is rather unfortunate that this point, which is the kernel of the ethical problem in the matter, is not brought out in the contributions. The owner who is also a manager obviously derives his moral title to reward from the knowledge, skill, and energy he devotes to the latter character and not to his arbitrary power as an investor (i.e., a lender of money which in many cases he has not earned by his own labour). Mr. Frisby's development of the special claims of the managers, while laying rightful emphasis on an aspect of industry rather under-estimated by earlier economists, falls into the fallacy of separating "management" from "labour" as though there were some fundamental distinction. Surely managers and foremen are just as much part of the labour element in the economic process as the technicians and labourers whose work they co-ordinate? The new terminology in economics makes its literature more complicated to follow, but have the basic facts so altered that the production of wealth is no longer a matter of labour working with tools and raw materials provided by previous labour and owned by the capitalist? Are not the moral issues still

(a) Whether it is inevitable that the ownership of capital should remain in irresponsible private hands or whether society should proceed to the stage of communal ownership in order to ensure the equitable distribution of wealth, and

(b) Whether the present antagonistic class division of society into owners (functionless as such) and workers should not give place to a co-operative society of workers (including managers), in order to ensure its democratic organisation and respect for personality and social function.

Doubtless the resolving of these issues will be a long and complicated process and much of what has been written in The Plain View by your contributors may be of value for this purpose. But the man in the street may well complain that it is difficult to see the wood for the trees in much of their elaborate argument.

22nd January, 1947. J. HENRY LLOYD

NOTICES

CONFERENCES. In addition to the five-day tour of Suffolk to study the plans for rural development, arranged for the Easter vacation, the Ethical Union has arranged two week-end conferences and a summer school. The general object of each conference, and titles of the sessions, are given below. Details may be had from the General Secretary.

Orientation of the Adolescent

A week-end Conference at High Leigh, Hoddesdon, Herts. June 13-16.

Adolescence is a phase of prolonged, difficult, and critical adjustment. Conflicts, sometimes severe, are normal at this time, dividing the adolescent within himself, and pitting him against his seniors, his own environment, the human world, perhaps even the cosmos. Too often these conflicts and problems, childish as they may be, are not satisfactorily resolved; and the evil consequences of this failure, personal and social, add up to something serious. The adolescent needs intelligent and resourceful help if he is to find himself and commit himself: he has to be won for the human cause, or he is unlikely to play a constructive part in the world. It is not enough to save him from the most obvious mistakes and dangers. The problem of his orientation is too important to be left altogether even to tried methods. A fresh approach is perpetually necessary. This conference puts in question the sufficiency of our knowledge and treatment of the problem, and re-opens discussion of the whole subject.

There are five sessions: (1) The Psychology of Adolescence; (2) At Home and at School; (3) At Work; (4) The Young Delinquent; (5) Orientation Courses.

Human Relations in Industry

A week-end Conference at High Leigh, Hoddesdon, Herts. July 18-21.

Improvement in the status of the industrial worker has been clearly shown (1) in the Education Act of 1944 which provides for his education, and further education, on a footing of social equality with all other citizens, (2) in the accepted principle of planning towns in constituent neighbourhoods of mixed occupations, ages, and income levels, using common social equipment and institutions, (3) in public recognition of the direct dependence of the nation's destiny upon the skill, responsibility, and industry of the workers, (4) in the problem, which promises to undermine our economy, of how to get done the unattractive work to which labour is no longer driven by want nor attached by habit. Since the industrial

workers are thus to be taken into the closest partnership on a footing of equality with other elements of society, and the bias in favour of white-collar employment has to be got rid of, it is time for those in walks of life remote from factories to make themselves acquainted with the outlook of industrial workers and the conditions of their work. This conference proposes to interpret to the non-industrial citizen the workers' life, with special attention to recent developments and new prospects.

There are five sessions: (1) The Industrial Worker, Yesterday, To-day, and To-morrow; (2) In the Factory, A. The Management Side—Personnel Policy; (3) In the Factory, B. The Workers' Side—Workshop Collaboration; (4) The Rôle of the State; (5) Class Relations.

The Moral Aspect of Education

Summer School at Royhill, near Buxted, Sussex, July 28 to August 2.

The essence of education is its totality, the interpenetration of all aspects and all phases, the balanced development of the complete person. The moral aspect is even less separable in practical treatment than the physical or the aesthetic. Given a sound general theory of education determining the content and treatment of the curriculum and the organization and activities of the school, the moral aspect necessarily takes care of itself. That is only true because it begs the question: the moral aspect is a principal determinant of sound theory. Therefore, although this aspect of education is not to be separated in practice, it is worth while to concentrate attention upon it and to ask what effective contribution each of the subjects of the curriculum can make to systematic moral education. The same question must be asked of school organization and school activities. Such an inquiry questions the moral sufficiency and appropriateness of current educational theory.

The intention of the course is to initiate systematic discussion of this aspect of education in connexion with: (1) the teaching of history, literature, geography, and science; (2) school organization and activities; (3) the possibility of orientation courses and of explicit instruction in the structure and functions of moral relations. The range will cover the work of both primary and secondary schools. There will be discussions on the changing rôle of (1) the family, (2) industry and the professions, (3) the citizen.

PUBLICATIONS. Power cuts have delayed the publication by Gollancz of *Puzzled People,* the inquiry into religious opinions conducted for the Ethical Union by Mass Observation, which will now appear in May at the earliest.

PRESIDENT. Sir Richard Gregory, F.R.S., has accepted nomination for election as president of the Ethical Union for 1947-48.

Printed in England by The Blackfriars Press, Ltd., Smith-Dorrien Road, Leicester, and published for The Ethical Union Inc. by C. A. Watts and Co., Ltd., 5 and 6 Johnson's Court, Fleet Street, London, E.C.4.